“Associated Membership” for Ukraine in the EU: Between Real Integration and an Imitation of Victory

Ukrainian negotiators are persistently advancing the idea of a “European-style association” as a preparatory stage on the path to EU membership, drawing on the experience of neighbouring countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. EU bureaucrats have gone into a defensive crouch, citing the lack of consensus among Member States on a European perspective and association for Ukraine. One of the EU heavyweights — France — is preparing for its Presidency of the European Council (the institution of the rotating Presidency of the European Council is still in place; there is no elected President of the European Council yet) and is working on a package of possible “historic” breakthroughs of the French Presidency in the Eastern European direction. The office of President Nicolas Sarkozy approaches allies and Ukraine with the idea of a so-called “associated partnership” — more than a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but less than an Association Agreement.

At that time, Ukraine did not agree to a vague political framework and ultimately secured a full-fledged Association Agreement, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area and a visa dialogue that eventually resulted in visa-free travel.

This experience matters. Interim formats can be used if they expand the space for integration. But they must not be accepted if they lock Ukraine outside full-fledged integration formats — association then, and full membership now.

The EU institutions and Member States sincerely want to help Ukraine withstand the war against the Russian aggressor and give it hope for a secure, democratic and prosperous future as an independent state. In this context, the European Union’s swift political response — granting Ukraine candidate status and agreeing to open accession negotiations — is understandable. And this clear high-speed track should continue to lead Ukraine towards the ultimate goal of membership.

Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s initiative on so-called “associated membership” for Ukraine in the EU appears, at first glance, to be an attempt to finally move the enlargement process forward — a process that has been stuck for too long between a grand geopolitical promise and slow-moving Euro-bureaucracy. There is a positive side to this: Germany, as a heavyweight, is ready to become an engine of enlargement, to speak of Ukraine as a future full member of the EU, and to look for interim instruments that would not leave us in a grey zone.

The idea primarily concerns the possible participation of Ukrainian representatives in European institutions, but without voting rights; broader access to programmes, funds and budgetary mechanisms; and potential security commitments from the EU in the logic of Article 42.7 — but without full membership itself.

Let us analyse the main risks and potential opportunities of the Merz initiative.

The main risk of such a construction is that the format depends on the political will of EU Member States. Today, Berlin has political will. Tomorrow, there will be elections in France, Poland, Germany, the Netherlands or another country where the Ukrainian issue is part of domestic political struggle. For Ukraine, a status that can be frozen after any subsequent electoral cycle is not a guarantee of membership.

The second danger is the decoupling of Ukraine from Moldova and the “Balkan wave” of enlargement. Ukraine and Moldova have been moving towards the EU as part of one geopolitical logic: two states leaving the Russian sphere of influence and anchoring themselves in Europe. If Ukraine is moved onto a separate track, the EU may obtain a convenient argument that Ukraine already has a special status, and therefore the opening of clusters, the closing of negotiating chapters and full accession can be postponed. This is especially dangerous if Moldova and other candidates remain in the classic, understandable process, while Ukraine finds itself in an exceptional but less defined format.

The third problem is a decline in motivation on both sides. An interim status may reduce the EU’s motivation to carry the process through to the end and to undertake its own internal reforms. The most difficult questions related to Ukraine’s full membership are obvious for the EU: the budget, agricultural policy, access to structural funds, voting rights, institutional weight and competition within the single market. “Associated membership” may become a way of saying: we have already done a lot, we have rewarded Ukraine, and now we can slow down because further steps are unpopular in European societies.

The risk for the Ukrainian authorities is no smaller. Such a format may become a comfortable political safety belt: EU flags are there; participation of politicians and bureaucrats in EU councils is there; endless visits to Brussels are there; and real reforms can be delayed because “we have already been more or less accepted.” This does not correspond to the interests of Ukrainian society. Ukrainians do not need symbolic chairs without a vote, photo opportunities for representatives of the authorities in European institutions, or various “European gimmicks”. They need genuine judicial reform, a reformed law-enforcement system, an independent anti-corruption infrastructure, fair rules of the game for business, protection of property rights, transparent regulators, and a predictable and prosperous state.

The fourth risk is that the initiative could become a lifebuoy for a government that does not demonstrate sufficient reform capacity and political will for reform. There is a temptation to sell “associated membership” as a historic victory, even if, in substance, it would mean a seat without a vote, partial access without full rights, and a new, improved wrapping for the old Association Agreement. This is not dangerous for the opposition or the authorities as such. It is dangerous for the country. European integration must not be an instrument of political PR or a project of one party; it must be an effective and inclusive mechanism for uniting and transforming the state.

The fifth risk is the discrediting of the very idea of the EU among citizens and business. Ukrainians support EU membership not because they dream of decorative presence in Brussels or of members in the European Parliament. For citizens, the EU means security, dignity, quality of life, freedom of movement and employment, fair courts, prosperity and a hopeful future. For business, it means unhindered access to the market, standards, investment, protection from arbitrariness, cheaper capital and clear regulation. If, instead of this, society is offered “under-membership” that does not allow people to feel the obvious benefits of membership, the European integration idea itself may be discredited. Eurosceptics will receive a simple thesis: we have once again been left in the waiting room, in the swamp. In a country exhausted by war, such mistrust can grow quickly and have unpredictable consequences — up to a return to ideas of “multi-vector” policy and a separate path, something Russian propaganda will actively work to promote.

Despite all these risks, it would be a mistake to reject Friedrich Merz’s proposal sharply and categorically. It contains strong elements.

First, Germany is demonstrating political will to move enlargement forward. This matters, because without Germany no major European process will have sufficient weight.

Second, the idea of opening all negotiating clusters as soon as possible corresponds to Ukraine’s interests. This should be the centre of the discussion and of our efforts — not symbolic institutional fantasies or the drawing up of lists of future “voiceless” Members of the European Parliament.

Third, the concept could become an “Association Agreement Plus”: deeper access to the single market, EU industrial chains, defence programmes, energy, transport, the digital space, financial and other practical instruments.

Fourth, mechanisms to punish backsliding on reforms can be useful for Ukrainian civil society. Ukraine needs not only carrots, but also sticks against attempts by the authorities to stop or imitate reforms. But these conditions must work honestly: they should discipline and motivate the Ukrainian authorities, not give the EU an excuse to postpone membership indefinitely.

Ukraine’s position should be simple: yes to everything that accelerates full membership; no to everything that substitutes for it or obstructs it.

Ukraine can agree to interim benefits only under clear conditions: the status must be temporary; the final goal — full membership — must be explicitly fixed; all negotiating clusters must be opened without political delay; Ukraine must not be decoupled from Moldova and other countries — such an interim status should be available to every candidate country; people and businesses must receive concrete benefits; and reforms must be not a declaration, but a strict requirement for the Ukrainian authorities.

Most importantly: no format without voting rights and real influence can be called a victory. It will be a victory when Ukraine becomes a full member of the EU and takes part in shaping the future of a united Europe itself.

In its time, the Sarkozy initiative — thanks to the right policy by the Ukrainian side — ultimately accelerated the conclusion of the Association Agreement. The Merz initiative may either accelerate Ukraine’s path to membership or, conversely, freeze it in the status of an “eternal candidate”.