MP Bobrovska warns army tensions are rising as Syrskyi loses public support

— What decisions do you personally expect from the president?

— First, as I understand it, we are waiting either for a new position for Mykhailo Fedorov or for him to return to his old one. Second, there is the question of a new commander-in-chief. It seems plain as day that such a decision is being prepared and discussed.

I am not entirely comfortable with harsh attacks on any commander-in-chief, regardless of who holds the post. But tearing up commendations and throwing away medals issued under the commander-in-chief’s signature crosses every reasonable line. We are not fighting for the commander-in-chief as an individual, and he is not the one who personally gives out the awards. This is a matter of...

— I had not seen that. Did someone tear up their awards?

— Yes. Commendations and awards have already been torn up. I believe emotions have gone too far. These are very troubling trends, and they need to be addressed.

— Serhii Sternenko, Fedorov’s former adviser, and others recently circulated reports alleging that service members were being ordered to record videos in support of Syrskyi. Are you aware of such cases?

— I have heard of such cases. This pattern is not new, and it will remain with us for years. It reflects the level of communication in our Armed Forces and among their command structures.

I also want to remind you that this was not only about recording videos. There was also a ban on attending political rallies, which is understandable. That prohibition has existed for a long time. It is contained in both the law and military regulations requiring political neutrality. We often demand that neutrality from every commander, I should remind you.

But yes, I heard about the videos. To me, this is the Armed Forces’ usual primitive approach to communications. There is absolutely nothing new about it.

They have once again paid the price because emotions are off the charts. Strategic and political tasks cannot simply be pushed down the chain of command and handled this way. They cannot be solved so crudely.

At some point, the army has to understand which tasks are best handled in a military fashion — where that is its strength — and where it is weak, particularly in communications.

— Are you prepared to name any potential successors to Syrskyi?

— No, I am not, and I will not play that game. I am not going to read tea leaves to guess who is more closely aligned with Zelenskyy and his requirements. I do not even want to discuss it because there is no point.

— Some argue that Syrskyi is one of Ukraine’s most experienced generals and that he has a talent for maintaining a balance among different factions in the military, making him the best person for the job. Those arguments naturally came from his defenders. How accurate are they? Is Syrskyi really so irreplaceable?

— Let us be honest. From the moment Syrskyi took office, there was an immediate split between Zaluzhnyi’s team and Syrskyi’s. People close to Valerii Zaluzhnyi were pushed out. There was enormous turnover among the heads of operational commands, sector commanders and brigade commanders.

We remember what happened to people who spoke publicly or commented on the situation at the front, in their military units and elsewhere. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction.

Today’s events are the culmination of those emotions. Still, I find it strange that there was not as much outrage when Skelia, the 155th Brigade and the Assault Forces were already being discussed publicly.

Syrskyi is becoming toxic. We all understand that, and we need to call things what they are.

But I am convinced that appeals from lawmakers or public demands voiced on the Maidan are neither an appropriate nor a normal way to replace the commander-in-chief. We are confusing our respective areas of authority and influence.

I am a staunch supporter of protests and the Maidan, and I consider them a Ukrainian expression of democracy. But everything has its limits and red lines. The Armed Forces are built on discipline, order and military service. Applying the rules of civil society to military service is wrong. Otherwise, the front will not stop at Mukachevo — we could end up fighting in Slovakia or Poland.

Returning to the commander-in-chief, his time has passed. It is time for changes and rotations. The military has been saying this, too — not publicly, but these conversations have been circulating internally. Now that he also faces such deep public disapproval outside the military, it is an entirely different matter.

— To sum up the question of replacing him, are you convinced that there are candidates to choose from? If the president wants to make a change, will he find a worthy replacement? Is that what you mean?

— Of course. First, no one is irreplaceable. That is an axiom.

Second, over more than three years of full-scale war, we have produced an enormous number of highly professional and effective people. They include career service members who entered the army as lieutenants and are now lieutenant colonels or brigadier generals. They also include people who came in as civilians and rose to significant positions.

There is a blend of the old school and the new school, along with an entirely new generation of commanders. There are new, young leaders across the branches and services, as well as unconventional command structures. The war has produced many outstanding leaders. Just give them a chance to prove themselves.

But again, the military is built on unity of command. Give people who could become commanders, including commander-in-chief, an opportunity to show what they can do.

— I want to return to Zelenskyy’s statement that he was tired of the conflict between Syrskyi and Fedorov and had decided to end their confrontation. Many people were left with the impression that Zelenskyy chose the past over the future and Soviet-style methods over progressive reforms. Do you agree? How do you explain the president’s choice? Many people have argued that dismissing both would have been fair. Why do you think he dismissed Fedorov but kept Syrskyi?

— First, I opposed Fedorov’s dismissal and, before that, the dismissal of his predecessor, Denys Shmyhal, because no one can deliver results in six months inside the behemoth called the Defense Ministry, which absorbed the Strategic Industries Ministry. It covers everything from production and underwear to contracts and mobilization — one enormous machine, a giant ministry.

I deeply regret that people did not protest Shmyhal’s dismissal because he was bringing everything under control and restoring order after the breakdown under Rustem Umerov.

Second, I believe business lobbying played an enormous role in Fedorov’s dismissal. That is my position. It was also a major source of friction between the commander-in-chief and the minister.

I am more than convinced that the president could have forced them to find common ground by making firm decisions himself. This would have applied to contracts, terms of service, policy on AWOL cases and draft evasion, and reform of territorial recruitment and social support centers, Ukraine’s military draft offices.

These three people — the supreme commander-in-chief, the commander-in-chief and the defense minister — needed a shared policy position. This is about making and implementing policy, and they cannot move forward without one another. That is my position.

But appointing someone for six months, when we are effectively heading toward a seventh defense minister during Zelenskyy’s presidency, is simply a mockery. This is not strategic governance at the state level. I do not even know what diplomatic term to use for it.

Listen, soldiers stay in their positions longer than our ministers stay in office. Someone could rotate into a position under Rustem and rotate out under Khmara. Is that normal?

— How do you interpret Zelenskyy’s choice? Why did he choose Syrskyi between the two? At least for now, since everything could still change.

— I do not think he chose. I think he has drawn the decision out over time. That is my assumption.

— So you believe the original intention was to dismiss both?

— No. I think people close to the president initially began telling him that it was time to remove Fedorov for several reasons. Some people did not like the procurement decisions. Others whispered to him about the conflict with Syrskyi.

I believe the decision was made without being properly thought through. The news was announced on a Sunday and came out of the blue. There was no candidate for defense minister, mobilization was offered as the sole justification, and there was also no replacement for the commander-in-chief.

Those are two inseparable links in the same chain. They cannot function while in conflict, but neither can function without the other.

Then Thursday came, and it turned out that the president was not ready with either decision. He had to improvise and stagger the decisions over time. That is how I see it.

But in my view, the mistake was made at the outset, with the announcement on Sunday that the government would be dismissed. The government could change, but the defense minister should have remained in place.

— You said at the beginning that Fedorov should return either to his old post or take a new one. So far, the discussion has focused on a new position as coordinator for new military technologies. We have not heard the president express any intention of returning Fedorov to the Defense Ministry. Do you consider that a realistic prospect?

— I do not think it is very realistic. But the president said clearly the day before that he hears the people in the streets and is holding talks.

Where could Mykhailo be most effective? At this point, an adviser post would be meaningless. An aide post would be meaningless. His only alternative would be to enter the military system, become a service member and work within it.

Otherwise, it simply will not work without the authority of the defense minister. Very few posts remain in the current setup. Even to serve in a command role, you must be a service member rather than a civilian and hold a military rank.