Prystaiko: Putin fears truce may end war, wants full control of Donetsk first

— I think many in our audience would like to understand what’s really happening in Istanbul.
— So would I.

— We've heard a lot of different opinions on air, but one in particular sounded quite plausible: to secure a 30-day ceasefire, Russian dictator Vladimir Putin would want something in return. He’d want to know what he gets for that pause. In other words, there could be negotiations over the price. We remember the kinds of proposals that were floated — at one point there was even global debate over whether the U.S. might recognize Crimea as Russian. So, can we figure out what kind of price Putin might demand for just a 30-day truce?
— There’s something to that idea. Putin always wants a price for everything, and why would he act otherwise — especially now, when his troops — slowly, but still — are advancing. As your colleagues have pointed out, summer is coming, the ground is hardening, mechanized units can move more easily, and soon the foliage will thicken, making it harder for drones to spot these pseudo-soldiers hiding in the tree lines. It’s obvious they’re preparing for offensives.

But I think there’s a deeper layer.

If Putin agrees to a 30-day truce, he also realizes it could mark the end of the war. That’s a danger for Russia — that the temporary ceasefire morphs into a permanent one. Entering negotiations, he would have to ask himself: “Okay, what have I achieved? What am I selling if the war ends?” Sanctions relief? Maybe [Donald] Trump finally gets what’s going on. But then Putin would have to face the fact that he hasn’t even captured all of Donetsk Oblast yet.

Before entering any talks, I think his priority is to complete what he jotted down as the goals of the so-called “special military operation.” That includes full administrative control over Donetsk. What happens with Kherson or Zaporizhzhya? He’ll keep pushing there, as we see. He’s also threatening Kharkiv and Sumy — but Donetsk is the “must.”

And besides Trump’s discontent, what else would push him to negotiate? Even Trump seems to justify everything to himself just to avoid confronting Putin. The broader U.S. establishment — the State Department, the White House — behaves just as passively. They keep leaving the door open for negotiations. That’s what they call it. But from our perspective, it’s just the same failed appeasement policy all over again.

— So, is it fair to say all of this is essentially a performance? These so-called negotiations, the illusion of a peace process — it’s all just for show until Putin finds something he can frame as a win? Like, say, he’s taken all of Donetsk Oblast?
— That’s the bare minimum he’s declared. If you recall, it’s not just what they’re saying in Istanbul now. From the beginning, we understood their priorities. First, establish the so-called land bridge to Crimea. Second, restore Crimea’s water supply — hence the canal seizure. Third, seize a power plant to provide electricity to both Crimea and the occupied territories. From the start, Putin promised those two “young republics” would be integrated. But even after three years, they haven’t reached the administrative borders.

And forgive me for playing devil’s advocate — for Putin, not us — but that’s his bare minimum. Everything else is just a bonus.

— So the demands remain maximalist. But let’s consider the current process. On May 10, European leaders came to Kyiv — French President Emmanuel Macron, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. They met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and essentially said, ‘Either there’s a 30-day ceasefire starting Monday, or we impose sanctions.’ Then Putin announces, ‘We’re ready for direct talks with Ukraine starting May 15.’ Trump posts in all caps: ‘Ukraine must agree to this immediately.’ Zelenskyy responds, ‘I’m waiting for Putin in Istanbul.’ Then there’s this long pause — no one knows if Putin will show up. Trump hints he might come, maybe even join the talks himself. In the end, as Zelenskyy put it, we get this theatrical delegation — with Medinsky again. What’s going on during this pause? Could it be some backchannel between the Kremlin and the White House?
— You’ve just built a textbook, structured model of diplomacy — a proper decision-making pyramid. But imagine things are much simpler. Who said Putin was actually thinking this through so deeply? From his point of view, European leaders arrive — and he openly ignores them. Because finally, he has access to the U.S. President — something the previous administration denied him for years. It was Macron calling, wasn’t it?

— Yes.
— And Scholz?

— Yes.
— But [former President Joe] Biden made the decision: “No. You don’t get that recognition.” And now, with these careless, irrational moves by the current administration, they’ve completely humiliated Europe. Putin sees no reason to even talk to them anymore. So, he doesn’t.

Look at what happened. European leaders, along with Ukraine, demanded a 30-day ceasefire or else sanctions. And then what? They backed down. Once again, humiliating themselves — because they didn’t get U.S. backing.

On our side, President Zelenskyy did exactly the right thing by saying, “I’m moving forward.” He tried to seize the initiative. But that, too, crashed against the Trump administration’s total rejection of Ukraine’s position. Because they still believe that neither Europe nor we are real players — the only one who matters is Trump’s favorite: Putin. Well, and Trump himself, of course.

This idea of, “Why should I go if he’s not coming?” — diplomatically speaking, you usually get close enough that you can hop on a flight and be there in three or four hours to show how you brought everyone to the table. But that didn’t happen.

From Putin’s perspective, he’s just inflating his value — by doing absolutely nothing. We imagine they were preparing something over there, but they could’ve just been sitting around, saying, “Let’s drag this out to the end. No one’s actually planning to come. Let’s see them scramble around like mad, guessing whether we’ll show up.” Maybe nothing at all was happening behind the scenes.

— So what do we have? Medinsky, some unknown figures — one of them, Fomin, was seen standing next to former Defense Minister Shoigu when he announced that “goodwill gesture” withdrawal from Kyiv.
— That’s all we know about him.

— Then there’s Galuzin — apparently just one of the many deputy foreign ministers under Sergey Lavrov…
— And not even the relevant one. Not [Sergey] Ryabkov — the deputy who’s actually been dealing with Ukraine all these years. Not even Lavrov, and not even the right deputy. That tells us everything.

What we can say for sure is that they sent these specific people to create a link to the previous Istanbul talks in 2022. They’ve already said they want to start from that old document.

So Russia’s sticking to the same position — one they’ve held all along but no one wanted to hear. Hopefully now it’s clear: nothing in Russia has changed, except that through our efforts and sacrifices, we’ve pushed them back from Kyiv, from the big cities, from Kharkiv, and more.

— But it’s also a way to humiliate Ukraine, isn’t it? I mean, at least they could’ve sent Lavrov, met Sibiha at that level. But they send Medinsky again — the guy who literally said Ukraine is part of Russia.
— They could’ve sent Lavrov. Even in the “good old days,” when they were still pretending these were just disgruntled Ukrainian miners and not their own agents — political and military — even then Lavrov showed up a few times. I remember when we arrived for a similar meeting, and my Russian counterpart, [Grigory] Karasin, didn’t come. At the next meeting, Lavrov told us, “Sorry, Grigory is a busy man.” And we just sat there thinking, “Why are we even here if he’s too busy?”

— President Zelenskyy called the Russian delegation a “theatrical farce.” Then the Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called him a clown, a failure, a man with an unknown education. Lavrov called him ‘a pathetic man.’ Our Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhiy Tykhy responded that the Russian Foreign Ministry isn’t leading the talks in Türkiye — their only job is to bark from Moscow. From the Russian side, it really doesn’t look like a serious conversation is possible. Are they just trying to provoke us into walking away?
— I don’t think they expected us to walk away. They know our presence doesn’t hinge on what Russia says. And honestly, if a politician reacts to words, it means he hasn’t yet developed the political thick skin needed to survive. Taking offense at words instead of actions makes no sense.

Yes, the two foreign ministries are trading jabs — maybe some people enjoy reading that in the press, watching it on Russia Today…

— It’s dramatic.
— Sure. Even on Ukrainian channels, people love to see us fire back at the enemy. But it has little to do with real diplomacy or effective negotiations.

— We also saw that a strong Ukrainian delegation came to Türkiye: President Zelenskyy, Foreign Minister Andriy Sibiha, Security Service head Vasyl Maliuk, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, and Chief of General Staff Andriy Hnatov. It was explained that, since we’re discussing a 30-day ceasefire, this was the appropriate level. There were even reports that we initially wanted to back out, but the U.S. convinced us to take part. Why would the U.S. want this? Just to get us at the table and call it a win?
— That’s the first reason. It’s always nice for someone to say, “I made this happen.” As for the delegation’s composition — let me remind you that during the Normandy summit in Paris [in 2019], I was there as Foreign Minister, and Ruslan Khomchak was there as Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General Staff. That signaled we were serious.

On the Russian side then, they sent Lavrov, Yuri Ushakov — the President’s foreign affairs adviser and former first deputy foreign minister — and Vladislav Surkov.

Back then, the Russians were serious about achieving peace — but we remember how it ended. They underestimated Zelenskyy as a political newcomer. Thought it’d all be over quickly. That failed. Eventually, they realized it’s not about who the Ukrainian president is — it’s that he’s Ukrainian. That’s what the people decided, and they won’t accept anything else.

This time, they didn’t send anyone serious because they’re just going through the motions — to avoid looking like they completely ignored the talks. Some countries, especially in the so-called Global South, don’t care about details. They just want to see that Russia showed up. Who cares if it’s Ryabkov or Galuzin? “Russia came.” That’s all they see. And Putin? “Oh, the sun’s not out yet.”

— We saw Foreign Minister Sibiha meet with Secretary of State Rubio and other European colleagues. I clearly remember a report that Marco Rubio had called both European and Ukrainian counterparts. So, discussions are constantly ongoing — while the Russians just sit and watch everyone run around. Are these talks achieving anything? Do they have real value?
— I think the practical value of those calls and meetings is pretty simple. Rubio is a smart man and a strong politician. Right now, he’s a hostage of the system — the chance the Republican Party gave him to become Secretary of State. That’s a huge deal for any U.S. politician. So he’s trying to meet expectations.

And that expectation is clear: he needs to make sure the Ukrainian president sits at the table and signs whatever — something we think Trump wants, but in reality, it’s what Putin wants. Trump would be fine with any document — as long as someone signs it. That’s all Rubio’s trying to accomplish.

— The U.S. president was asked whether he was disappointed by the level of Russia’s delegation in Istanbul. He replied, “I’m not disappointed. Why should I be? We just made $4 trillion,” referring to recent deals with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. He said he didn’t even know who was in the Russian delegation — hadn’t checked. “Nothing will happen until I meet with Putin.” Should we expect such a meeting?
— First, we have to understand that he’s forgotten about us.

— Totally.
— They used to at least pretend to be politically correct — saying Putin and Zelenskyy should meet, but they couldn’t because of personal hatred, or because officers and soldiers had fought too long to just stop. So he has a very simplistic view of both the problems and the war itself.

But now, sadly, he doesn’t even understand that we need to be at the table. And he may soon face an interesting reality: Ukrainians have their own interests, their own vision of the future, and their own position — which might not align with his.

And by the way, the Europeans have figured this out after 12 years of war with Russia. Trump may soon realize the first thing he needs to understand is what the Ukrainian people are willing to accept. Then he can try to fit that position into a framework that even Putin might accept. But don’t impose it on us.

By the way, I still don’t see any real decision on U.S. aid. We’ve long understood that the U.S. can pressure Ukraine by threatening to cut that lifeline. And the pittance they’ve tossed us — $50 million — that’s nothing.

Does Trump really believe that the “respect” he demands will change us? That it will change Zelenskyy and the entire Ukrainian people — including the soldiers standing on the front line right now? I think he’s about to get a sharp dose of reality.

— We’re constantly under this threat that the U.S. might walk away from the talks. That’s been emphasized again and again. I think it started in Paris, when Secretary of State Marco Rubio gave a press briefing at the airport and was asked about Ukraine.
— The funniest part? They’re threatening Russia with the same thing. Can you imagine Russia being concerned that the Americans might walk away from the peace talks? Thank God!

— What would it mean for us if the U.S. did leave the talks? I’ve heard from different diplomats that it would be bad — that we must keep them involved. Why is that, if you agree with that assessment?
— I remember the earlier negotiations, and our biggest problem back then was that the Americans weren’t at the table. They tried to join in Geneva, but by the time the Normandy talks happened, they were gone.

I used to ask American diplomats: “How did you manage to duck out of this long, painful process?” And they would smile, even sincerely, and say, “We know it’s difficult and unpleasant. Getting involved would mean confronting the Russians. But we’ve got lots of other issues to resolve. And honestly, we believed the Europeans could handle things on their own continent.”

Well, all this time that Europe has failed to handle it should’ve led to one conclusion: we really needed the Americans at the table — on our side. To balance out Russia. To make it clear — not just with authority, but with military and economic power — where Russia stands.

Right now, I still see the Americans at the table. But I’m not sure they understand whose side they’re on.