Kudrytskyi warns Ukraine is already late to prevent next winter’s energy crisis — NV interview

19 February, 04:47 PM

Exclusive

According to the government, since the beginning of 2026 Russia has carried out nearly 220 strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. (Photo: REUTERS/Valentyn Ogirenko)

This winter has been the most difficult for Ukraine’s energy system since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. As the first cold weather arrived, Russian forces methodically struck energy infrastructure in Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast, as well as in Kharkiv, Dnipro and Odesa.

The capital proved unprepared for that scenario and, for the first time during the war, faced its most severe energy crisis, coming within a step of catastrophe.

NV asked Kudrytskyi whether Russia might ease its attacks as warmer weather returns, how Ukraine can move away from Soviet-era thermal generation, and what should replace it to get through the next winter and heating season with fewer risks.

— In your view, can we expect that once warmth and sunlight return, Russia will lose interest in attacking Ukraine’s energy sector because it becomes too expensive for them?

— I wouldn’t rule that out. In previous years we did see a drop in Russian shelling after winter. Take the winter of 2022–2023 — the first winter of the full-scale war and the missile-and-drone campaign. Around mid-February, electricity outages stopped, the effectiveness of Russian strikes dropped sharply, and they shifted to other targets. After that, there were no strikes on energy infrastructure for more than a year.

So yes, it’s possible. Their appetite for these attacks depends directly on how much damage they can actually cause. The less effective the strikes, the less incentive they have to continue.

— It’s clear that in warm, sunny weather electricity consumption falls and green generation increases. But how important is green generation overall?

— From March to roughly October, solar plays a noticeable role in the electricity balance. Over the year as a whole, wind and solar together account for about 10%. But during that warmer period, solar’s share is higher because in winter there’s almost no sun. From March to October, solar can cover up to 20–25% of national consumption during certain hours.

— And wind?

— Wind mattered before Russia’s invasion. Unfortunately, after the invasion we lost part of our wind capacity in temporarily occupied territories.

Right now, several companies are actively developing wind projects. They’re capital-intensive and take longer to build than solar plants. But wind has a major advantage: it’s strongest during the heating season — the toughest time for the system. That’s when solar is practically useless. Wind can really support the grid in winter.

A lot of wind capacity is under construction. It hasn’t all been commissioned yet, but some of it is already operating.

— What new heat and power generation should Ukraine build, and how should it differ from what we had before?

— I’d put it differently. The question isn’t what specific technology we need. The question is: what mix of sources can most effectively cover the country’s consumption?

We have to consider where we are now. We have a strong nuclear sector. We also have to factor in military risks that will remain even after the war when we design the future structure of the system.

Ukrenergo, as the system operator and the only body that defines the optimal structure of the future energy system, has already answered this. We will keep our nuclear base. As long as our nuclear power plants are operational, they will continue to run.

But we are rapidly losing Soviet-era coal generation and large combined heat and power plants running on coal and gas — like those in Kyiv and Kharkiv. These are centralized, large facilities. A few missile strikes are enough to knock out a major share of generation.

So the answer is a mix of sources to replace that Soviet-era generation built in the 1960s, 1970s and partly in the 1980s.

First, solar and wind. Their operating costs are extremely low — almost zero — because the sun and wind are free once the station is built. That’s much cheaper than burning coal.

But they’re variable. They don’t produce electricity when consumers need it; they produce it when weather allows. To integrate them, we need storage systems — large industrial batteries. They let you store solar power during the day and shift it to evening, when consumption peaks.

We also need highly flexible gas generation. Not huge centralized gas plants like before, but decentralized ones. Instead of one 1,000 MW plant, imagine 100 smaller 10 MW plants spread across the country.

This kind of generation can be deployed relatively quickly — within about a year. These are containerized gas piston engines. They’re much more efficient than the old large plants — roughly twice as efficient. They use about half as much gas per unit of electricity. That’s a huge saving.

So that’s the mix: renewables, distributed storage across Ukraine, and fast, flexible gas plants. That combination would stabilize and balance the system, make it more resilient to Russian strikes, and replace the part of the energy balance that has to be phased out because of attacks and age.

— So generation needs to be decentralized?

— Exactly. We’ll keep nuclear, which is by definition centralized. But everything else should be built as a network of relatively small power plants and storage systems.

It’s one thing to attack 15 energy facilities. It’s another to try to attack 500–1,000. That would require many times more drones and missiles. Given Russia’s economic problems and massive budget deficit, scaling production to that level would be extremely difficult.

That’s the strategic response to the energy terror Russia is carrying out against Ukraine.

— Summer is just three months away. Consumption will rise, and nuclear units will go offline one by one for maintenance. In a sense, we still have to “get through” the summer. What should we expect?

— If Russia really eases off, I think we can get through the summer without major problems. I mean we won’t see catastrophic levels of electricity outages. There may be outages, but not as painful as in summer 2024.

The second scenario is that Russia intensifies attacks, including with Shahed drones, which it produces in large numbers. In that case, we could see fairly serious outages during periods of summer heat.

After the spring flood ends and water levels in the Dnipro and Dniester rivers fall — usually after May — hydropower output drops. During summer heat there’s simply less water. At the same time, nuclear units are in their most active phase of fuel reloading and maintenance.

If Russia launches intensive attacks during that window, we could face problems similar to summer 2024.

Those are the two basic summer scenarios.

But I don’t agree that there’s plenty of time before next winter. From a household perspective, maybe. People can still buy a small gasoline generator if they live in a private house. They can think about an EcoFlow or other backup options. From that angle, there’s time.

From the system’s perspective, though, eight or nine months is very little. Deploying decentralized generation takes six to 10 months. If you count from today, we’re already running late if we want to be fully prepared for next winter.

One of the government’s key performance indicators should be to commission as much capacity as possible in spring, summer and fall. We need to enter next winter with more decentralized generation in place.

And we absolutely must not repeat scandalous and completely inexplicable actions like blocking tenders for new generation, which the Energy Ministry under Herman Halushchenko carried out last year. Halushchenko is under investigation and suspected of money laundering and participation in a criminal organization. Instead, we need to continue deregulation, especially simplifying grid connections to regional operators and Ukrenergo. That makes life easier for investors, speeds up new capacity and attracts more investment. It costs the state nothing and can deliver real results.

— What can realistically be done to soften the blow of winter 2026–2027? And what are we actually doing?

— On top of the decentralized generation already operating — which by my estimates is 600–700 MW, and by others up to 1 GW — we can realistically add another 500–600 MW of gas piston capacity.

Solar will continue to grow. Businesses are building plants for their own use. Households are installing rooftop solar. Energy storage — industrial batteries — is developing actively. These systems help cover the most difficult hours of the day, morning and evening, including in winter.

We won’t eliminate the systemic deficit before the next heating season. But we can mitigate the impact of potential Russian attacks next winter.

— The toughest issue is money. Economy Minister Oleksii Sobolev says urgent needs total $1 billion — for generation capacity, mobile substations, backups and equipment. That’s just for urgent needs. Where will the money come from?

— For urgent rebuilding before winter, funding usually comes from international partners. But to ensure these and even larger funds flow into the sector, the key factor is trust from Western partners. That’s especially important after the Mindichgate corruption scandal.

Donors need to be sure the money won’t be stolen. That means trusting the management of energy companies and the institutions that regulate them, including the national energy regulator.

We’re in a transitional phase. The leadership of the Energy Ministry has changed. Supervisory boards are being reshaped. But dozens and hundreds of officials remain — in state companies and institutions — who cooperated with the structure created and led by Tymur Mindich, Halushchenko and others.

Put yourself in the donors’ position. It’s hard to channel large sums to Energoatom if even the head of the agency, who appeared on NABU recordings, hasn’t been replaced. The same applies to Centrenergo and other companies. And the regulator is crucial, because it sets the rules of the market.

— Many international funds say they’re raising money for Ukraine’s energy sector. Are you satisfied with how that money is being used, and where can we see results?

— For urgent damage repair, I’d rate it 3+/4-.

For longer-term needs — protective structures at plants and substations, or stimulating decentralized generation — until recently I would have rated the government’s work as unsatisfactory.

That said, there are signs of cautious optimism after Denys Shmyhal became energy minister. I hear from companies and industry representatives that things are gradually improving. I also hear that the State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development under Serhii Sukhomlyn is handling protection of energy facilities more effectively. That’s encouraging.

From my perspective, building decentralized generation, in recent weeks there’s been clear interest from the Energy Ministry, the Economy Ministry and the government in encouraging investment. There’s also a push for further deregulation to speed up the process. So there is some positive momentum.

— In summer 2025 you and Dragon Capital founded Power One, focused on distributed generation — batteries and gas piston plants. You planned to reach 60 MW in the first stage and then 150 MW in 2026. Have you met those targets?

— We’ve built several facilities, though total capacity is somewhat lower than that initial milestone. The 60 MW target was for the first phase, which runs until mid-2026, not the end of 2025.

We’ve already commissioned our first gas piston plants. We’re connected to the grid. It took us eight months to build the first capacity from scratch.

We secured a loan from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development to complete the first phase of about 67 MW. We received the first tranche at the end of last year and are using it to finish that phase. We expect to complete it in summer.

Plans for this year remain unchanged. We aim to raise more capital to build additional balancing capacity so the system can cover daily peaks — morning and evening.

The project is moving actively. Initial electricity sales show solid economic results.

— How easy is it to scale this in Ukraine?

— From a procedural standpoint, it’s actually easier now in Ukraine than in Europe.

There are two main challenges. First, debt capital. There isn’t enough available domestically. If you want to build a large portfolio — hundreds of megawatts — you need to work with international financial institutions like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment Bank and others.

Second, there’s a paradox. Physically, we have a capacity deficit. On paper, though, there are many grid connection permits for facilities that were never built.

A key regulatory change would be to revise how regional operators and Ukrenergo calculate network capacity. When issuing connection permits, they shouldn’t assume the worst-case theoretical scenario where all possible generation at a node runs simultaneously. That situation exists only on paper.

In practice, those conservative assumptions create barriers to connecting urgently needed generation and storage.

Together with other investors, we’ll likely propose changes to improve and optimize this process. It would cost the state nothing — no subsidies are needed. It’s simply a more realistic way to calculate network capacity. That would open up many more opportunities to connect new power plants to the system.

Follow us on Twitter, Facebook and Google News